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The PLoS Medicine Debate
B
ackground to the debate: In 2004, the United States Food 
and Drug Administration approved a radiofrequency 
identiﬁcation (RFID) device that is implanted under the skin 
of the upper arm of patients and that stores the patient’s 
medical identiﬁer. When a scanner is passed over the device, 
the identiﬁer is displayed on the screen of an RFID reader. 
An authorized health professional can then use the identiﬁer 
to access the patient’s clinical information, which is stored 
in a separate, secure database. Such RFID devices may have 
many medical beneﬁts—such as expediting identiﬁcation of 
patients and retrieval of their medical records. But critics of 
the technology have raised several concerns, including the 
risk of the patient’s identifying information being used for 
nonmedical purposes.
Mark Levine’s Viewpoint: RFID Devices Have the 
Potential to Improve Medical Care
Radiofrequency identiﬁcation devices are tiny, potentially 
implantable appliances that can store clinical information 
that is able to be captured remotely. Their use has the 
potential to make signiﬁcant advances in the effectiveness, 
efﬁciency, and safety of medical care by improving patient 
identiﬁcation, promoting patient safety, and expediting 
access to patients’ medical records. Yet, as with all new 
technologies, their adoption must be tempered by attention 
to potential unintended consequences.
Today’s implantable RFID devices are passive instruments 
capable of short-range transmission only when activated by 
an external energy source, such as a radio transmitter. The 
United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which 
regulates medical devices, has not yet approved self-powered, 
or active, devices. The information stored on a passive RFID 
appliance cannot be edited or changed. It may be accessed 
by exposing the device to a predetermined radiofrequency 
at a sufﬁciently close range. The device converts this external 
energy into a signal that can be received and translated by the 
transmitter. The information thus captured is speciﬁc to the 
person carrying the implanted appliance or to the device to 
which it is attached (such as a surgical sponge).
Ethical concerns regarding the use of RFID devices arise 
from issues pertaining to informed consent, the privacy and 
accessibility of stored information, and the purposes for 
which the transmitted data will be used. Patients must trust 
that RFID devices will not be implanted or removed without 
their prior consent. When seeking patients’ consent to 
implant an RFID device, physicians must do two things. First, 
they must disclose the possibility of unauthorized access to 
the information stored on the device. Second, they must allow 
patients to determine how their stored information is to be 
used, and who will have access to it.
Patients must also be conﬁdent that their personal 
information will be used solely for clinically beneﬁcial 
purposes. Physicians must therefore take additional 
responsibility for ensuring that human-implantable RFID 
devices are used only to improve patient care and are 
not abused for nonclinical ends, such as identiﬁcation of 
the presence, age, and/or other personal information of 
an individual. Moreover, physicians must take efforts to 
ensure that implanted devices are able to keep clinical 
data conﬁdential and protected from unauthorized access. 
Such unauthorized access could potentially result in social 
discrimination, the loss of health care coverage, or the 
publication of potentially sensitive medical information.
Physicians do not bear sole responsibility for ensuring the 
safety of RFID devices. The FDA assists in protecting patients’ 
conﬁdentiality by requiring that patient-speciﬁc information 
contained in RFID devices consist only of a unique identiﬁer 
that can be used to access patients’ clinical records, which are 
stored in a separate, secure database. This two-step process 
of linking identiﬁcation to an external data source greatly 
diminishes the likelihood that sensitive patient information 
will be disclosed to an unauthorized source.
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The functional capabilities of RFID devices may continue 
to expand, especially if active RFID devices are approved by 
the FDA. It might then be possible for such devices to disclose 
the location of the wearer or to carry more explicit individual 
information that could be abused.
If the above concerns can be properly mitigated and if 
continued use of these devices conﬁrms their potential to 
improve the quality of patient care, physicians would have an 
ethical obligation to advocate for their widespread adoption. 
At the same time, we should continue to examine the safety, 
efﬁcacy, and social consequences of these devices as part of 
our constant commitment to improve patient care.
Ben Adida, Kenneth Mandl, and Isaac 
Kohane’s Viewpoint: RFID Implantation 
May Invade Privacy
The American Medical Association (AMA) recently issued 
a report on “Radio Frequency ID Devices in Humans,” 
which concluded that these small implantable devices “may 
help to identify patients, thereby improving the safety and 
efﬁciency of patient care” [1]. The AMA recommends that 
during the informed consent process for RFID implantation, 
patients should be told of “medical uncertainties associated 
with these devices.” However, health policy makers, doctors, 
and the public must understand that RFID devices, unlike 
other forms of medical technology, have an impact upon 
patients’ privacy that extends far beyond the medical arena. 
With an implanted RFID device, individuals can be tracked 
surreptitiously by anyone using a generic RFID reader, 
available for just a few hundred dollars. The informed 
consent process needs to present this risk clearly, and the 
AMA should amend its report to speciﬁcally address this 
unusual risk.
An RFID chip is typically a simple piece of hardware 
with a unique identiﬁer and a small amount of read/write 
storage. Currently, this storage is insufﬁcient for signiﬁcant 
medical information, so the chip usually stores only a patient 
identiﬁer, which links to a complete electronic record stored 
separately. The AMA correctly warns that if patient data 
were eventually to be stored on these RFID devices, they 
should be protected with the same level of access control 
as that required of current medical record systems, using, 
for example, data encryption. What the current policy fails 
to address is that every RFID device publicly advertises its 
identiﬁer. Even if the patient identiﬁer were encrypted in the 
device’s read/write storage, the unique identiﬁer remains 
readable by any RFID reader—medical or nonmedical. In 
addition, RFID readers can function surreptitiously, at a 
distance of up to a few feet.
Consequently, RFID devices have been aptly described as “a 
kind of license plate for people” [2]. If such devices become 
widely deployed, they may provide an incentive for both well 
and ill-intentioned parties to set up readers for these “license 
plates.” A store owner might set up a reader to track frequent 
customers, linking the unique identiﬁer to the customer 
record upon ﬁrst purchase. Law enforcement might leverage 
RFID as a means of ubiquitous surveillance. Because the RFID 
identiﬁer is of no medical signiﬁcance, it is not protected 
by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA), and there are no laws that regulate how and by 
whom it can be read; the possibilities for privacy invasion by 
inter-database linkage are vast.
A case study from another industry where RFID devices 
were implemented is informative. New US passports include 
an RFID chip that stores basic information about the passport 
holder. However, in response to criticisms of potential 
identity theft and privacy violation by surreptitious readings 
[3], three safeguards were put in place: (1) data on the 
passport are encrypted; (2) the encryption key is printed 
on the inside of the passport, so that physical access to the 
passport is required for decryption; and (3) the passport is 
shielded, so that even its unique RFID identiﬁer cannot be 
read while closed.
It does not appear, from the AMA statement, that any of 
these safeguards have been considered for the medical use of 
RFID chips, and when the device is implanted, the latter two 
become somewhat difﬁcult to implement. Until RFID devices 
have the capacity to store reasonable amounts of live medical 
data, a safer, less invasive, and less expensive approach may be 
a simple medical bracelet with the patient identiﬁer printed 
as a barcode. In any case, the issue of surreptitious reads of 
the RFID identiﬁer must be considered.
As personalized medicine incorporates a wider range of 
advanced technologies, these sorts of crossover consequences 
will become more frequent and we will need to heed lessons 
learned in nonmedical ﬁelds. Given the importance of 
privacy in health care, the AMA should set a strong privacy-
friendly precedent with its RFID recommendation. There 
are many applications of RFID technology that can improve 
health care, but the implantation of these devices into 
patients merits a healthy dose of skepticism. At the very least, 
the informed consent process must transparently convey the 
signiﬁcant societal side effects of RFID devices.
John Halamka’s Viewpoint: RFID Devices 
Enable Patients to Be Stewards of Their 
Own Health Data
In December of 2004, I was implanted with a VeriChip 
RFID device.
As a physician and chief information ofﬁcer, I felt qualiﬁed 
to evaluate the medical, legal, moral, and privacy aspects of 
the device. After using the device for three years, I am not an 
evangelist for implanted RFID, but I believe it can be valuable 
for some patients who understand the risks and beneﬁts.
My implantation process was simple—a ﬁve minute ofﬁce 
procedure, which included disinfection of the implant site 
on my upper right arm, a few cubic centimeters of lidocaine, 
and insertion of the injector into my subcutaneous fascia. I 
did not experience pain, bleeding, or any post-procedure 
infection. The implant is not palpable, does not migrate, 
and has no physical side effects such as itching, irritation, 
or changes in skin appearance. The RFID device does not 
impede my activities; even while rock or ice climbing I have 
hit the implant site many times without any problems. The 
device is undetectable by airport security metal detectors and 
hand scanners.
One possible side effect is that my RFID device can be 
scanned by retail security systems using 134.2 kHz RFID 
technology, the frequency of my implant. I have had 
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seemed to set off the anti-theft systems. My personal data are 
not readable by such systems, but they may be able to detect 
the presence of an implanted RFID tag.
Given my experience, what are the risks and beneﬁts?
The medical risks of any implant are infection, pain, keloid 
formation at the puncture site, and reaction to the local 
anesthetic. There are quite a range of nonmedical risks. After 
my implant, I received many e-mails saying that I had become 
a “Borg” and had lost some of my humanity because I was 
now a hybrid human/machine. Some e-mails even referred to 
the Book of Revelation, noting that I now carried the number 
of the Beast. Thus, chip carriers have a risk of being social 
outcasts.
The chip holds a static and unencrypted 16 digit number, 
which is used to point to a Web site containing personal 
health record data. The Web site requires a username and 
password, ensuring appropriate security. It is conceivable 
that a person on a subway could scan a patient’s number 
without their knowledge and steal their medical identity 
by creating an identical chip and implanting it. This is a 
very theoretical risk because hospitals are not widely using 
implanted RFID chips as a means of identiﬁcation. If the 
implanted chip were used for security purposes, such as 
opening a door to a secure area, the person who scanned the 
patient on the subway could replay the RFID signal and gain 
access to the secure area. Again, this is purely theoretical 
since implanted RFID devices are not often used as security 
authenticators.
If these are the potential risks, what are the beneﬁts? Since 
we have no universal health identiﬁer in the US, there is no 
simple way to uniquely identify a patient at all sites of care. 
The result is a fractured medical record scattered in inpatient, 
outpatient, laboratory, pharmacy, and emergency department 
sites. The implanted RFID devices enable patients to establish 
health care identities and become the stewards of their own 
data. The patient can assemble a reconciled medication list, 
a complete problem list, and a list of diagnostic study results, 
and then apply personal privacy preferences—for example, 
deleting information about mental health, HIV, or substance 
abuse. This patient-controlled record is available to treating 
clinicians in the case of emergency via the implanted device. 
It is a personal choice whether or not to be ﬁtted with an 
RFID device, but for some patients such a record has value. 
For example, such devices may be particularly helpful for a 
patient with Alzheimer disease who cannot give a history, a 
patient prone to syncope who may not be initially conscious 
during an emergency department visit, or a very active 
person who engages in extreme sports activities and could be 
noncommunicative due to injury.
I believe that in the near future, patients will own their 
medical records and be the stewards of their own health care 
data. Implantation of RFID devices is one tool, appropriate 
for some patients based on their personal analysis of risks and 
beneﬁts, that can empower patients by serving as a source 
of identity and a link to a personal health record when the 
patient cannot otherwise communicate.
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